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Best Perpetual DEXs · Rank 03 of 8
Traders who want a model they can fully understand
Last verified August 16, 20264 scored axes
Documented, with gaps
GMX scores 8.2 out of 10 and ranks #3 of 8 in the best perpetual dexs table, strongest on decentralisation (8.8) and weakest on funding & fees (7.8).
A pooled-liquidity design where the counterparty is an on-chain pool with published composition, which makes the risk unusually legible. Zero-slippage execution against an oracle price is elegant until the oracle is the attack surface, as a 2022 exploit demonstrated.
4 axes, weighted as published in the table’s methodology. Each score below is read from the fact printed under it.
8.4/ 35% of the score
Pooled counterparty model with oracle-priced execution; the record includes a September 2022 price-manipulation episode on a thin market and a July 2025 re-entrancy in the v1 GLP accounting path that took roughly $40m — the attacker returned the funds and kept a $5m bounty, and v1 was wound down afterwards.
7.8/ 25% of the score
Fill size is bounded by pool size and published per-market open-interest caps rather than by resting orders.
7.8/ 20% of the score
Published open and close fees plus an hourly borrow fee charged against the pool; there is no funding auction between longs and shorts.
8.8/ 20% of the score
Contracts on Arbitrum and Avalanche sit behind a governance timelock; execution depends on a designated oracle set; margin is non-custodial.
GMX's counterparty is a pool whose composition is public, priced by an oracle rather than by a book. That makes the risk unusually legible: no hidden inventory, no market maker whose balance sheet you cannot inspect, entry at the oracle price with no slippage on supported markets. For traders who want to understand rather than merely use a venue, this is the most transparent design in the category.
In September 2022 a thin market was manipulated against the pool. In July 2025 a re-entrancy in the v1 GLP accounting path allowed roughly $40m to be taken; the attacker returned the funds and kept a $5m bounty, and v1 was wound down afterwards. Oracle-priced execution removes slippage and concentrates risk in the price feed — that is the trade the design makes, and it has been tested twice.
Open and close fees plus an hourly borrow fee charged against the pool, with no funding auction between longs and shorts, means holding a position for weeks is expensive in a way that is easy to underestimate. Fill size is bounded by pool size and published per-market open-interest caps, not by resting orders.
Order-book venues have taken most of the flow GMX once had. The protocol still distributes real fees to liquidity providers on-chain and remains the easiest perp design to reason about, but it is no longer where the volume is.
Traders open positions against a shared liquidity pool at a price supplied by an oracle, rather than matching against other traders' orders. Liquidity providers earn the fees and take the other side of trader profit and loss.
Yes, in July 2025: a re-entrancy in the v1 GLP accounting path allowed roughly $40m to be drained. The attacker returned the funds in exchange for a $5m bounty and v1 was subsequently wound down. A separate 2022 episode involved price manipulation on a thin market.
Because it charges a borrow fee against the pool for every hour a position is open, instead of the funding exchange between longs and shorts that order-book venues use. Over weeks that accumulates.
8 services in best perpetual dexs